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1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right of privacy encompasses a woman's deci-
sion to have an abortion within certain limits). For a more complete discussion of the holding
in Roe, see infra note 65.
President Reagan stated explicitly his opposition to Roe and his willingness to use the fed-
eral judiciary to overturn it. Helen Thomas, UPI, Aug. 5, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library ("In many areas-abortion, crime, pornography, and others-progress will take place
when the federal judiciary is made up ofjudges who believe in law and order and a strict
interpretation ofthe Constitution.... It is not our heritage as Americans to turn our backs on
massive, legalized abortion .... Today we proclaim what our heritage has always maintained:
that all human life is sacred."). During his eight-year tenure, President Reagan appointed
three new Supreme Court Justices-Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony
Kennedy-and ippointed William Rehnquist Chief Justice. These Justices joined Justice
White in forming the majority that challenged the tenets of Roe's trimester system. Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
Like President Reagan, President Bush stated his desire to see Roe overturned. SeeAbortion
Demonstrators, Converge on Capitol, UPI,Jan. 23, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (discuss-
ing how President Bush announced, over loudspeakers at an anti-abortion demonstration,
that Roe was "wrong" and urged the Supreme Court to overturn it). While President Bush
never stated outright that he would use the federal judiciary to overturn Roe, he did run on a
platform that stated: "We reaffirm our support for appointment ofjudges who respect tradi-
tional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life." REPUBLiCAN NATIONAL Combirr-
TEE, THE REPUBLmcAN PLATFORM 1992, at 22 (1992). President Bush nominated David Souter
and Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court. As expected,Justice Thomas has demonstrated
his willingness to overturn Roe by joining the dissent in Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Justice Souter's position in Casey, on the other hand, was more
of a surprise, as he joined the majority that upheld the right to abortion as fundamental.
David G. Savage, The Rescue of Roe vs. Wade; How a Dramatic Change of Heart by a Supreme Court
Justice Affirmed the Right to Abortion, Los ANGELES TiMEs, Dec. 13, 1992, at Al. Some conserva-
tives have assailed President Bush because of'Justice Souter's support for the preservation of
the principles of Roe. Richard Brookhiser, Gravedigger of the Revolution: George Bush and Con-
servative Revolution, ATLANTrc, Oct. 1992, at 70, 75-76.
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der to "protect the sanctity of innocent human life."2 In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Rehnquist Court
came dangerously close to doing it.3 But when it walked up to the
abyss of America-without-Roe and peered down into it, the Court's
majority saw the Court tearing the nation apart and destroying its
own legitimacy in the process.4 With a nascent centrist bloc made
up of'Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter finding its voice and
joining the pro-Roe Justices, Blackmun, and Stevens, the majority
came back from the edge.5 With the election of President Bill
Clinton, who is strongly pro-choice, and the likely appointment of
several new Supreme CourtJustices during his first term, the funda-
mental right of American women to choose abortion will be pre-
served,6 albeit subject, for now, to obstacles that may be set by
states to complicate, though not unduly burden, a woman's right to
choose.7
2. REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, FAMILY, NEIGHBORHOOD, WORY, PEACE, FREEDOM, PROPOSED
BY THE COMMITrEE ON RESOLUTIONS TO THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION 13 (1980);
REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, AMERICA'S FUTURE FREE AND SECURE, PROPOSED BY THE COMMIT"EE
ON REsOLUrIONS TO THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION 51 (1984); REPUBLICAN PLAT-
FORM, AN AMERICAN VISION: FOR OUR CHILDREN AND OUR FUTURE, PROPOSED BY THE COM-
MITrEE ON RESOLUTIONS TO THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION 31-32 (1988); and
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITEE, THE REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 1992, at 22 (1992).
3. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). The Court reaffirmed Roe, while upholding an "informed
consent" requirement, id at 2823; a 24-hour waiting period, idL at 2825-26; a parental consent
requirement, id at 2832; and a reporting and recording requirement, id at 2832-33.
4. The Court addressed the impact of overruling the essential holding of Roe:
Whether or not a new social consensus is developing on that issue, its divisiveness is
no less today than in 1973, and pressure to overrule the decision, like pressure to
retain it, has grown only more intense. A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding
under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost
of both profound and unnecessary damage to the court's legitimacy, and to the Na-
tion's commitment to the rule of law.
Id. at 2816.
5. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Id at
2803-38. Justice Blackmun concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 2843-55
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. I, at
2838-43 (Stevens, J., concurring).
6. During his campaign Governor Bill Clinton made the following statement at a news
conference:
Because the judiciary has been so politicized in the last ten or eleven years and be-
cause that decision [Roe] is hanging by a thread, I would expect any judge that I
appoint to have an expansive view of the Bill of Rights, including the right to privacy,
including the right to choose ....
Cragg Hines, ClintonjudidalAppointees to be "Pro-Choice, "He Vows, Hous. CHRON., July 1, 1992,
at A8.
At least one member of the Supreme Court has admitted, anonymously, that Roe "will never
be overturned now." Savage, supra note 1.
7. A state may now pass any requirements intended to protect the health and safety of
the pregnant woman as long as these requirements do not constitute an "undue burden."
The Casey Court only minimally clarified the hazy concept of "undue burden":
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regula-
tion has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid be-
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In this sense, the Supreme Court's decision in Casey represented
the last chance-for decades at least, perhaps forever-for conserv-
atives to abolish the constitutional right to abortion.8 Thus, we can
understand Justice Antonin Scalia's enraged dissenting opinion in
Casey as a cri de coeur, the swan song diatribe for the Court's anti-Roe
Justices. His thoughts, however, command special attention be-
cause they illustrate in striking fashion how the conservative consti-
tutional imagination suppresses, misappropriates, and inverts the
historical and constitutional experience of African-Americans and
American women of all races.
I. INTRODUCTION: A CURIOUS ANALOGY
At the close of his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia repeatedly
likens the Supreme Court's decision in Roe to its holding in the Dred
Scott case.9 It is a startling, disorienting analogy, saturated with
more than a century of political meaning. By bringing one of the
most significant freedom-expanding decisions in American history10
into association with the Court's most racist and pro-slavery deci-
cause the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be
calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it.
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2820 (1992). Justice Scalia fur-
nishes a critique of the majority's unprincipled departure from Roe and its development of an
unmanageably open-textured standard for adjudicating abortion regulation. Of course, Jus-
tice Scalia's purpose is to argue for an abandonment of Roe rather than a stout adherence to it.
Id. at 2875-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. This conclusion is reinforced by the Court's denial of certiorari in the Guam case. Ada
v. Guam Soc'y of Obstets. & Gynecs., 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that Guam's law
proscribing all abortions except in cases of medical emergency is unconstitutional on its face),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992). See Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term: Forward-
TheJustices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22 (1992) (discussing the fact that the
judicial conservative revolution emanating from the Supreme Court never materialized to the
extent anticipated, demonstrated in part by the refusal of the Court to completely overturn
Roe v. l11ade, and that the true division amongst theJustices is not along political lines, but is
actually between those who use "rules" and those who use "standards.").
9. Casey, 112 S. CL at 2883-85 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19
How. 393 (1857)) (holding that a member of the African race cannot be a citizen of the United
States and, therefore, the Circuit Court could not have diversityjurisdiction in a suit involving
a freed slave).
10. I say this because Roe v. Wade established normative principles of female sexual sov-
ereignty, gender equality, personal sexual freedom, and bodily liberty from state regulation.
But see ANGELA Y. DAvis, WOMEN, RAcz & CLAss 202-21 (First Vintage Books 1983) (1981).
With regard to the consequences and importance of Roe, its "freedom expanding" impact was
not universally celebrated. Id The abortion rights movement leading up to Roe, and continu-
ing afterward, was almost exclusively a white women's campaign. African-American women,
and other women of color, were largely missing from its membership and politics. Id. at 203.
One of the reasons for this phenomenon lies, in part, in the original feminist movement's
reactionary attitudes on questions of race and class, attitudes that even led sometimes to the
advocacy of involuntary sterilization of African-American women. Id at 203-05, 214-21. Ad-
ditionally, having access to legal abortions was not seen as equally liberating to women who
could not afford them. Id at 206. Generally, while many white women have fought against
being forced to reproduce, many minority women have fought against being forced not to
reproduce-permanently. Id. at 215-21.
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sion, Justice Scalia dresses up and takes to Court the pro-life move-
ment's pet analogy between the nineteenth-century right to own
slaves and the twentieth-century right to have an abortion.11 Justice
Scalia's comparison of Roe and Dred Scott, however, is as fallacious a
claim about American constitutional doctrine and method as the
comparison between slavery and abortion is an insidious perversion
of American history. In fact, while the methodology of the Supreme
Court's decision in Dred Scott bears almost nothing in common with
Roe, it turns out to be nearly identical to Justice Scalia's own elabo-
rated method of constitutional analysis: originalism based on strict
textual analysis and a study of relevant social tradition.1 2 Roe and
Dred Scott are, in fact, opposites, not only in methodological and ju-
risprudential terms, but as representations of specific visions ofjus-
tice and liberty in American history. Justice Scalia's analogy
amounts to an attack on the importance of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, and an assault on the idea of
human freedom as the organizing spirit and meaning of the Ameri-
can Constitution.
II. TH. ELEMENTS OF THE ANALOGY-SCALIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL
METHOD AND His ATrACK ON ROE
In order to understandJustice Scalia's analogy, we must place it in
the context of his full opinion and his general interpretive method-
ology of textual analysis informed by social tradition,13 the tech-
nique with which he applies his philosophy of "faint-hearted
11. In the more debased and explicit version of this comparison, abortion foes assert
that fetuses are comparable to slaves andjust as slaves were denied their fundamental human
rights under Dred Scott, so are fetuses under Roe. SeeJohn Moore, Lobbying the Court, 21 NAT'.
J. 908 (1989) (stating that the American Life League ran full-page advertisements in The Wash-
inglon Post, The Washington Times and USA Today linking Dred Scott, the Nazis' 1936 decrees
stripping German Jews of their legal rights, and Roe); see also Clarence Thomas, Why Black
Americans Should Look to Conservative Policies, Address at The Heritage Foundation (June
18, 1987), in 119 THE HERrrAGE Lzc-urRs at 1, 8 (praising as a "splendid example of apply-
ing natural law" an article comparing the right to abortion with the right to own slaves and
stating that both violate inalienable rights) (citing Lewis E. Lehrman, The Declaration oflndepen-
dence and the Right to Life, Am. SPEaTATOR, Apr. 1987, at 22); Lewis E. Lehrman, The Right to Life
and the Restoration of the American Republic, NAT'L RaV., Aug. 29, 1986, at 25 (comparing abor-
tion to slavery and the protection of abortion rights in Roe to the protection of slavery in Dred
Scott); Jim Clardy, 'Invisible Man' Keyes Gets Rousing Welcome by Party, WAsH. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1992, at A5 (quoting Maryland Senate candidate Alan Keyes, speaking at the 1992 Republican
National Convention: 'Just as our forbearers insisted on respect for the humanity of enslaved
blacks, we must insist on respect for the humanity of unborn children . .. ."); Nat Hentoff,
Civil Rights and Anti-Abortion Protests, WASH. PosT, Feb. 6, 1989, at All (stating that pro-lifers
should be compared to the abolitionists since "like the slave, the fetus is property and its
owner can dispose of it.").
12. See infra notes 14, 18-20 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 14, 18-20 and accompanying text.
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originalism."' 4 Justice Scalia contends that the question posed in
Casey is easily answered. He formulates the question as whether
"the power of a woman to abort her unborn child.., is a liberty
interest protected by the Constitution of the United States."1 5 He
answers: "I am sure it is not."'1 He reaches this conclusion "be-
cause of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely noth-
ing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society
have permitted it to be legally proscribed." 7 This analysis cogently
represents Justice Scalia's specific methodology for defining rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion: given the unhelpful generality of the phrase "due process," he
contends that the only liberty interests that can be recognized by the
Fourteenth Amendment are those "rooted in history and tradi-
tion.""' In defining whether a liberty is so rooted, the decisive his-
torical tradition to be relied upon is the "most specific" one which
can be found "protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted
right.... .19 Thus, because there is a social tradition prior to Roe
permitting states to regulate and indeed criminalize abortion, due
process cannot be said to include a right to choose abortion.20
14. See justice Antonin Scalia, Oiginalism The Leser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 864
(1989) ("1 hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist."). In this
article,.justice Scalia defends originalism-searching for the "original meaning" of constitu-
tional language--as being the interpretive philosophy most consistent "with the nature and
purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system." Id. at 862. The purpose of constitutional
guarantees, he asserts, "is precisely to prevent the law from reflecting changes in original
values that the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable." IL The
reason thatJustice Scalia's originalism is "fhint-hearted" is because he would import an "evo-
lutionary" intent or possibility into his reading of the Constitution where its "original mean-
ing" would compel a clearly indigestible result, such as "upholding a statute that imposes the
punishment of flogging." IL at 864.




18. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989). See infra text accompanying note
57.
19. IL at 127. For a discussion ofJustice Scalia's method of analysis see Laurence H.
Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1057
(1990) (challengingJustice Scalia's suggestion in Michael H. that his method of selecting the
appropriate method of generality is value neutral). See also Robin West, The Ideal of Liberly: A
Comment on MichaelH. v. GeraldD., 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1373 (1991) (arguing thatjustice Scalia's
interpretation of substantive due process in Michael H. is so narrow that it leads to the "effec-
tive end" of the doctrine); David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, andJustice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1699 (1991) (analyzingJustice Scalia's approach to tradition); Rebecca L. Brown, Tra-
dition and Insight: A Theory of Cognitive Interpretation (unpublished article, on file with The
American University Journal of Gender & the Law) (analyzing the role tradition plays under differ-
ent theories of constitutional interpretation).
20. justice Scalia introduced his view that the right to abortion is not part of our "long-
standing traditions" in Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (holding an Ohio statute constitutional that requires unmarried, un-
emancipated minors to notify a parent or obtain a judicial by-pass to obtain abortions).
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe mirrors this view:
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If Roe is fatally flawed because the right to abortion is secured
neither by Constitutional text nor by social tradition, Justice Scalia
argues, then the only arguments for preserving Roe's core protected
right are to honor stare decisi 2 1 and protect judicial legitimacy in the
public mind. Justice Scalia quotes the majority opinion's articula-
tion of these arguments in his dissent:
[The American people's] belief in themselves as... a people [who
aspire to live according to the rule of law] is not readily separable
from their understanding of the Court invested with the authority
to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for
their constitutional ideals. If the Court's legitimacy should be un-
dermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability to see
itself through its constitutional ideals.22
This passage prompts Justice Scalia to counter that it is by failing to
overrule Roe that the Court undermines its legitimacy, at which
point he introduces an analysis of Dred Scott into his opinion.23
"In my history-book," he writes, "the Court was covered with dis-
honor and deprived of legitimacy by Dred Scott v. Sandford, an errone-
ous (and widely opposed) opinion that it did not abandon .... -24
Thus, at first blush, it seems thatJustice Scalia is only comparing Roe
to Dred Scott because neither decision was overruled, and he thinks
both should have been; that is, they are both good examples of blind
faith in stare decidsi. 25 He goes further, however, and links the cases
The fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority sentiment in
those States, had restrictions on abortions for fit least a century is a strong indication,
it seems to me, that the asserted right to an abortion is not 'so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Mass.,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). Justice Scalia noted that a discussion ofwhether there was a tradi-
tion oflaws proscribing abortion constituted a significant portion of the Roe decision. Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973)).
21. For a discussion ofJustice Scalia's outlook on stare dedsis, see infra note 25 and accom-
panying text.
22. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2883 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Casey at 2815-16).
23. Id at 2883 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393
(1857)).
24. Id at 2883 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
25. Justice Scalia has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to overturn precedent. Ac-
cording to him, the doctrine ofstare decisis "exists for the purpose of introducing certainty and
stability into the law and protecting the expectations of individuals and institutions that have
acted in reliance on existing rules." Walton v. Arizona 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). However, when a line of cases "finds no proper basis in the Constitution" and
conflicts with a line of cases that is constitutionally sound, Scalia argues that the goals of stare
decisis cannot be met. In such a case, Scalia abandons stare decisis. Id at 672-73 (arguing that
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976),
should be overruled because they are irreconcilable with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972)). Scalia has argued that where "precedent is not only wrong, not only recent, not only
contradicted by a long prior tradition, but also has proved unworkable in practice, then all
reluctance [to overrule precedent] ought to disappear." Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497
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at the doctrinal level, asserting that "Dred Scott... rested upon the
concept of 'substantive due process' that the Court praises and em-
ploys today." 26 Moving his critique from doctrine to political com-
mentary, Justice Scalia finally suggests that the Court will come to
mourn its decision in Casey the same way he imagines ChiefJustice
Taney regretting his opinion in Dred Scott.27 Scalia describes, at
great length and with almost comic solemnity, a portrait of Taney
that hangs in the Harvard Law School:
U.S. 62, 110-11 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the Court's limitations on patronage
and arguing that Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 247 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507
(1980) should be overruled).
For a discussion of the apparent paradox between Justice Scalia's adherence to tradition
and his willingness to overturn precedent see Strauss, supra note 19, at 1715 (concluding that
it is not surprising thatJustice Scalia would want to overrule some precedents given his "sub-
stantive agenda" and the relatively recent Warren Court decisions challenging "entrenched
practices.").
Justice Scalia has stated that "[w]e have long recognized, of course, that the doctrine of stare
decisit is less rigid in its application to constitutional precedents ... and we think that to be
especially true of a constitutional precedent that is both recent and in apparent tension with
other decisions." Harmelin v. Michigan, III S. Ct. 2680, 2686 (1991) (arguing that the
Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee and that, therefore, Solem v.
Helm, 363 U.S. 277 (1983) was wrongly decided). Other cases in which Scalia has advocated
overruling precedent include: South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805,819 (1989) (Scalia,J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) should be overruled) and
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (ScaliaJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) should
be overruled). See also Robert A. Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Scalia'sJurisprudence, 12
CARDOZO L. Rav. 1685, 1685 (1991) (arguing that "[mlore openly than any other justice sit-
ring today, Antonin Scalia is ready to reverse prior Supreme Court precedent.").
26. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2883 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Under the doctrine of substantive due process, the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain rights from arbitrary and unreasonable in-
terference. The rise of the Supreme Court's application of substantive due process occurred
in the 1930s. During this period, the Court struck down state statutes regulating economic
activity. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York law limiting
the hours that a bakery employee could work to ten per day and sixty per week as interfering
with the liberty to contract in violation of the Due Process Clause). The demise of substantive
due process protection for economic rights came about in United States v. Carolene Prods.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938) (holding that in cases involving an economic regulation, there is a pre-
sumption of constitutionality and that the statute need only be "rationally" related to the
goal).
In the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has used the doctrine of substantive due pro-
cess to protect non-economic rights, in particular the right to privacy. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding that the right of a married person to use contracep-
tives falls within the "penumbra" or "zone" of privacy guaranteed by the Bill of Rights).
Other rights protected under substantive due process doctrine include the right to die,
Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); the right to travel, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and the right to engage in one's chosen profession, Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957). See infra note 68 and accompanying
text (discussing additional cases relating to rights protected by substantive due process and
assailed by Justice Scalia).
27. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (stating that like the Dred Scott Court,
the Casey Court unrealistically thinks that it settled "an issue involving life and death, freedom
and subjugation . . ." but that actually, the Court merely "prolongs and intensifies the
anguish.").
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He is all in black, sitting in a shadowed red armchair, left hand
resting upon a pad of paper in his lap, right hand hanging limply,
almost lifelessly, beside the inner arm of the chair. He sits facing
the viewer, and staring straight out. There seems to be on his
face, and in his deep-set eyes, an expression of profound sadness
and disillusionment. Perhaps he always looked that way, even
when dwelling upon the happiest of thoughts. But those of us
who know how the lustre of his great ChiefJusticeship came to be
eclipsed by Dred Scott cannot help believing that he had that case-
its already apparent consequences for the Court, and its soon-to-
be-played-out consequences for the Nation-burning on his
mind. I expect that two years earlier he, too, had thought himself
"call[ing] the contending sides of national controversy to end
their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in
the Constitution." 28
III. MISREPRESENTING DRED ScoTr, A MASTERPIECE OF
SCAUIA-LIKE ORIGINALISM
As a claim about constitutional doctrine and methodology, Justice
Scalia's analogy is not only badly misleading, but actually backfires
on his polemical purpose. Dred Scott was most definitely not "the
original precedent for... Roe v. Wade," 29 as the originalist constitu-
tional method employed in Dred Scott is wholly foreign to the digni-
tary and rights-based Fourteenth Amendment assumptions of Roe.
Even more importantly, however, Dred Scott's methodology closely
resembles Justice Scalia's own interpretive method of originalism in-
formed by majoritarian social tradition.3 0
The essential holding in Dred Scott had nothing to do with substan-
tive due process.3 1 It was a jurisdictional decision, turning on
whether an African-American could be a federally recognized "citi-
zen" of a state for the purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction
in federal court.32 Dred Scott, a slave in Missouri, brought suit in
federal court against his owner, a New York citizen.3 3 He asserted
that he had been legally emancipated when a prior owner brought
28. Id
29. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2883 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (quoting DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CoN-
STITION IN THE SUPREME CouRT 271 (1985), for the proposition that Dred Scott was the origi-
nal precedent for Roe). See infra notes 60, 62, 65, and accompanying text (discussing the basis
for Roe in the right to privacy found through the Fourteenth Amendment).
80. For a discussion of the constitutional method employed in Roe, see injra notes 60, 62,
65, and accompanying text. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's constitutional method see
supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of the validity ofJustice Scalia's claim that the holding in Dred Scott
was based on substantive due process see infra note 86 and accompanying text.
32. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 400 (1857).
33. Id
[Vol. 1:61
PECULIAR ANALOGY IN PLANNED PARENTHOOD
him to Illinois, a free state, and then to portions of the Louisiana
Territory, which was made free under the terms of the Missouri
Compromise. 34 Justice Taney disposed of the suit by holding that
there was no diversity jurisdiction because no African-American
could be a "citizen" of a state within the meaning of the United
States Constitution.35
Justice Taney framed the dispositive question as whether
a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and
sold as slaves, [can] become a member of the political community
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the
United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and
privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the
citizen?3
6
The Court answered in the negative, holding that the descendants
of African slaves, whether free or not, are not endowed with the
rights and privileges of citizenship because the Constitution does
not include Africans, nor was it intended that they be included as
citizens.37 The Court continued:
On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated
by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet re-
mained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges
but such as those who held the power and the Government might
choose to grant them. 38
In order to reach this conclusion regarding the Framers' original
understanding, Justice Taney focused his lengthy analysis on the
original meaning of the text of the Constitution, and the social and
legal traditions of the nation and the states39-that is, precisely
34. The Court considered two claims presented by Dred Scott: that he and his family
were free as a result of their stay in the Missouri Territory and that he was free because of his
stay in Illinois. Id at 431-32.
35. Xi at 430. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTlTtrrsoNAL LAW 549 (1988) (re-
lating that Dred Scotll is "often recalled for its politically disastrous dictum and wholly gratui-
tous announcement by Chief Justice Taney that the Missouri Compromise was
unconstitutional. The decision's greatest constitutional significance, however, lay in its hold-
ing that African-Americans could not bring suit in federal court or become United States
citizens.").
36. Id at 403.
37. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 403 (1857).
38. I. at 404-05.
39. Justice Taney, like Justice Scalia, was clearly an originalist. Taney described the
Supreme Court's interpretive project in Dred Scott in the following terms:
It is not the province of the [C]ourt to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy
or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or
law-making power, to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitu-
tion. The duty of the [C]ourt is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with
the best lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it, accord-
ing to its true intent or meaning.
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those inquiries urged also by Justice Scalia.40 Justice Taney relied
heavily on two clauses in the Constitution that mention African-
Americans, referring to them as a separate class of persons, as clear
evidence that they were not considered citizens when the govern-
ment was formed.4 ' The first provision reserved "to each of the
thirteen States the right to import slaves until the year 1808 ...- 42
and "by the other provision the States pledge themselves to each
other to maintain the right of property of the master, by delivering
up to him any slave who may have escaped from his service, and be
found within their respective territories." 43 The Court stated that
these two provisions show, conclusively, that neither the descrip-
tion of persons therein referred to, nor their descendants, were
embraced in any of the other provisions of the Constitution; for
certainly these two clauses were not intended to confer on them
or their posterity the blessings of liberty, or any of the personal
rights so carefully provided for the citizen.
44
Beyond the fine print of the Constitution, Justice Taney placed
detailed emphasis on provincial and state laws enslaving and op-
pressing the African-American population to
show that a perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be
erected between the white race and the one which they had re-
duced to. slavery, and governed as subjects with absolute and des-
potic power, and which they then looked upon as so far below
them in the scale of created beings, that intermarriages between
white persons and negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatu-
ral and immoral, and punished as crimes, not only in the parties,
but in the person who joined them in marriage
45
Thus, in the same way that Justice Scalia relies on state statutes
criminalizing abortion to show that abortion was not a part of the
"longstanding traditions" of American society,46 the Dred Scott
Id. at 405. My colleague James Boyle has completed a wonderful analysis ofJustice Taney's
opinion in Dred Scott as an exemplary piece of "original understanding"jurisprudence. James
Boyle, A Process of Denia Bork and Post-Modern Conservatism, 3 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 263, 290-94
(1991). Boyle points out the paradoxical quality ofJudge Robert Bark's spirited attack on
Dred Scott in the course of proclaiming his own (new-found) faith in the doctrine of "original
understanding." Id. at 292-94. It is increasingly clear that Dred Scott is the decision that con-
servative jurists love to hate but hate to explain.
40. Dred Scott, 19 How. at 403-30.
41. Id. at 411.
42. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 411 (1857) (citing U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cls.
1, 5 and § 10, cl. 2 (expired 1808)).
43. Dred Scot, 19 How. at 411 (citing U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CoNsr.
amend. XIII).
44. Dred Scott, 19 How. at 411.
45. Id. at 409.
46. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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Court used the history of slavery and anti-Black statutes to show
that African-Americans were never thought of as citizens.47 In the
colonies, Justice Taney observed,
a negro of the African race was regarded... as an article of prop-
erty, and held, and bought and sold as such, in every one of the
thirteen colonies which united in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, and afterwards formed the Constitution of the United
States.... The legislation of the different colonies furnishes posi-
tive and indisputable proof of this fact.
48
The Court then cited a Maryland provincial statute punishing mis-
cegenation by free blacks by returning them to slavery, and a Massa-
chusetts colonial statute providing for a severe whipping of "any
negro or mulatto" who "shall presume to smite or strike" any white
person. 49 The Court also invoked the post-Revolutionary "statute
books," which were
full of provisions in relation to (African-Americans], in the same
spirit with the Maryland law .... [The states] have continued to
treat them as an inferior class .... [A]s relates to these States, it is
too plain for argument, that [African-Americans] have never been
regarded as a part of the people or citizens of the State[s] .. 50
Justice Taney thus used none other than Justice Scalia's constitu-
tional method to arrive at the conclusion that the United States was
a hereditary republic based on the exclusionary principle of white
supremacy.51 Although Justice Scalia wants to identify Dred Scott
with Roe, Dred Scott turns out to have been a model application of
Scalia's own constitutional jurisprudence. Of course, since the con-
cept of "social tradition" is essentially indeterminate, and thus ines-
capably value-laden in application, it is surely possible to arrive at
other conclusions in Dred Scott using Justice Scalia's interpretive
methodology. The text of the Constitution and social tradition
could have been read differently if one squinted more in the direc-
47. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 408-20 (1857).
48. Id at 408.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 412.
51. Of course, Justice Scalia may honestly disagree with Chief Justice Taney over the
"substantive due process" question that was decided unnecessarily the Dred Scott Court. After
finding thatjurisdiction did not lie, Chief'Justice Taney went on to declare the Missouri Com-
promise unconstitutional because Congress lacked the power to ban slavery in a federal terri-
tory acquired since the Constitution was written. The logic of this position was that, since
constitutional rights applied against Congress even in the territories, and slaves were property
under the Constitution, Congress could no more liberate slaves taken by their owners into
federal territories than it could "quarter a soldier in a house in a Territory without the con-
sent of the owner, in time of peace," or "take private property for public use without just
compensation." Id. at 450. The alternative position, of course, was that Congress, as local
sovereign for the territory, had as much power to ban slavery there as a state government had
to ban slavery within its own boundaries. Id. at 604-27 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
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tion of liberty. The script of the Constitution nowhere foreclosed
the possibility of African-American freedmen 52 becoming citizens of
their states and, as a matter of tradition, several states had actually
given freedmen their civil and political rights.5 3 Thus, the Court
might have found, using Justice Scalia's methodology, that African-
Americans could become citizens within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion. Indeed, this is roughly the position thatJustice Curtis takes in
his dissent.5 4 But one could only arrive at this destination if one
52. It should be noted that the term "freedmen" is an accurate reflection of conditions
of the time because women, both African-American and white, were generally without civil
and political rights. For example, women were denied the right to vote until the adoption of
the Nineteenth Amendment August 18, 1920. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX. Even then, African-
American women (and men) were generally prevented from exercising this right. Infra note
85.
Women were also denied other rights on the basis of their gender. In the first gender
discrimination case, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873), the Supreme Court upheld an
Illinois law that prohibited women from practicing law. It was not until the Supreme Court
ruled in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), that sex discrimination was deemed a violation of
equal protection. See generally WiLLAM B. LOcmmRT ET As-, CONSrTrUTONAL LAW 1286-1308
(6th ed. 1986) (tracing the development of gender discrimination as a violation of equal pro-
tection from its inception to recent times).
Furthermore, African-American women have been particularly vulnerable, throughout our
country's history, to the denial of political and civil rights because of the double discrimina-
tion that they face. For general discussions on this topic, see Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair
Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 2 DUKE LJ. 365 (1991) (discussing the
difficulty the law has, in its current form, dealing with African-American women and the dual-
ity of the discrimination they face); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing DrugAddicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419 (1991) (revealing the
perspective of poor Black women with regard to the prosecution of pregnant drug addicted
women and factoring the several forms of oppression that these women face into the analysis);
Cathy Scarborough, Note, Conceptualizing Black Women's Employment Experience, 98 YAL L.J.
1475 (1989) (examining the history of African-American women's work experiences from
slavery to the present); Kristin Bumiller, Symposium: Excluded Voices: Realities in Law and Law
Reform: Rape as a Legal Symbo" An Essay on Sexual Violence and Racism, 42 U. MAMi L. REv. 75
(1987) (analyzing the racist and sexist elements of rape and rape laws).
53. Five of the thirteen original states granted free native born inhabitants citizenship at
the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation. They were New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New York, NewJersey, and North Carolina. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How.
393, 573 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
54. To support his argument that African-Americans could be considered citizens,
Justice Curtis quotes "the fourth of the fundamental articles of the Confederation ... 'The
free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice, ex-
cepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several
States ......."and points out that since some states granted citizenship to free persons of color,
the effect of the fourth article of the Confederation was to "confer on such persons the privi-
leges and immunities of general citizenship . ..." Id. at 575 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
Justice Curtis concludes this was "not only known to those who framed and adopted those
articles, but the evidence is decisive, that the fourth article was intended to have that effect,
and that more restricted language, which would have excluded such persons, was deliberately
and purposely rejected." Id at 575 (Curtis, J., dissenting). To support this conclusion,
Justice Curtis describes a failed attempt to amend article four to include the word "white"
before the word "inhabitants" which took place in Congress on June 25, 1778. Id at 575-76
(Curtis, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Curtis maintains, there is nothing in the Consti-
tution that, "proprio vigore, deprives of their citizenship any class of persons who were citizens
of the United States at the time of its adoption; or who should be native-born citizens of any
state after its adoption; nor any power enabling Congress to disfranchise persons born on the
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were looking for relevant dissenting traditions of freedom and resist-
ance to the dominant national structures of racism and slavery.
Justice Scalia cannot make this move and thereby escape the per-
fect logic of his alignment withJustice Taney. ForJustice Scalia has
argued that the Court must consult the "most specific" social tradi-
tion available to define liberty interests, and wherever specific social
traditions prohibit a practice, then that practice cannot attain the
status of a fundamental liberty.55 Thus, in Casey, Justice Scalia
found it conclusive that the Constitution mentioned no right to
abortion and "the longstanding traditions of American society have
permitted it to be legally proscribed." 56 Similarly, he asserted in
Michael H. v. Gerald D. that natural fathers do not have any parental
rights to children born into extant marital unions because the states
had never recognized such rights.57 He notes that the Court applied
the same logic in its holding in Bowers v. Hardwick,58 where it pointed
out that the majority of states had, at one point or another, criminal-
ized sodomy.5 9 Thus, based on Justice Scalia's reasoning, the fact
that the federal government and the overwhelming number of states
refused to make African-Americans citizens would have to dispose
of the assertion that they had a constitutional right to be defined as
citizens by the states. At any rate, the fact that justices equally com-
mitted to orginalism had to choose between competing social tradi-
tions in Dred Scott demonstrates the essential indeterminancy of the
originalist method.
Beyond the extraordinary congruence between the Taney and
Scalia approaches to constitutional liberty, it is obvious that the
holding in Dred Scott has little in common with the logic of Roe.
Where Dred Scott decided that African-Americans had no constitu-
tional right to be treated like citizens, Roe decided that women have
a constitutional right of privacy. "This right of privacy," Justice
Blackmun wrote,
soil of any state, and entitled to citizenship of such State by its Constitution and laws." Id at
576 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
55. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's view of the
use of tradition in defining rights).
56. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
57. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
59. MichaelH., at 127 n.6 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986)). Justice Scalia is responding to justice Brennan's contention that his reliance on the
most specific historical tradition in Michael H. is "novel." Justice Scalia cites the Court's hold-
ing in Bowers in which the Court, in its decision that there is no right to engage in homosexual
sodomy, relied upon the fact that 82 of the 37 states had criminal sodomy laws at the time the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified; all 50 states had such laws up until 1961; and 24 states
and the District of Columbia had such laws when the case was being decided. Id
19931
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whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is,
or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
6 0
From the standpoint of legal doctrine, Dred Scott and Roe could not
be more dissimilar: what separates them is the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and its revolutionary impact on individual liberty in the fed-
eral system.6 1 Whatever its flaws, Roe began with the federal liberty
interests of each individual, interests that were rooted, the Court
argued, in the Fourteenth Amendment.6 2 This amendment had ef-
fectively overturned the bitter legacy of Dred Scott, which began with
the principle of perpetual white supremacy and found that African-
Americans could never be citizens within the meaning of the Consti-
tution.63 Under Dred Scott, African-Americans could never challenge
final state court decisions enforcing enslavement or violations of
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Roe balanced this fundamental right of pri-
vacy in reproductive decision-making against the state's "important interests in safeguarding
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life.. ." to develop the
trimester approach. Id. at 154.
61. See ROBERTJ. IACZOROWSiu, THE POLITICS OFJUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FED-
ERAL CouRTs, THE DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985) (discussing
the judicial enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments and citizens' rights). According
to Kaczorowski,
[t]he adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the
various civil rights statutes was predicted [sic] on the primacy of national authority
over the rights of citizens. These amendments and statutes gave federal officers and
federal courts criminal jurisdiction over civil rights cases. This jurisdiction, previ-
ously held under state authority by state officers, was a novel one for the federal
judiciary. Federal jurisdiction over criminal violations of citizens' civil rights re-
quiredjudicial acceptance of legal theories that affirmed the primacy of national au-
thority to enforce and protect fundamental rights. Congress's civil rights legislation
thus encompassed revolutionary constitutional and legal theories and revolutionary
changes in federal functions.
Id at xi; see also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrruTONAL LAW 408 (1Ith ed. 1985) ("With the hind-
sight of more than a century, it is clear that th[e] [13th, 14th, and 15th] Amendments, and
particularly the 14th, have spawned national protection of a wide range of individual rights,
procedural and substantive.").
62. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53, 168-70 (holding that the concept of liberty, under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, embraces a woman's right to have an
abortion).
63. In Dred Scott, the Court's refusal to extend citizenship to African-Americans was
rooted in the principle of white supremacy. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 404-07
(1857) ("We think they are.., not included, and were not intended to be included, under the
word 'citizens' in the Constitution.... On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and,
whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority .... ).
The Fourteenth Amendment overturned Dred Scott because it declared that any person born
in the United States was a citizen of the United States and of the state in which the citizen
lived; that no state could "deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law. . ." and that every person within itsjurisdiction was entitled to "the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
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their civil rights. 64 In contrast, Roe found that women had a privacy
right protecting them from state criminal prosecution and imprison-
ment for having abortions.65 Dred Scott thus upheld the broad pow-
ers of slavery and condemned the African-American population to
its fate within the state legal and criminal justice systems; 66 Roe up-
held broad rights of individual liberty and rescued women from the
exercise of tyrannical power by state criminal justice systems. 67 Dred
Scott made the Fourteenth Amendment necessary; the Fourteenth
Amendment made Roe possible.
IV. THE SPIRIT OF FREEDOM, THE MISSING INGREDIENT INJUSTICE
SCALIA'S CONSTITUTION
Because it suppresses the historical and legal meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Scalia's analogy between Dred Scott
and Roe constitutes an affront to the principle of freedom as the
guiding spirit of the modem Constitution.68 Freedom was not a
64. See Dred Scott, 19 How. 393 passim (holding that African-Americans were not entitled
to the rights and privileges extended to the citizens of this country). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 32-38.
65. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
furnishes women with a right to privacy that restricts state involvement in the decision to
terminate a pregnancy).
This right, however, is not absolute, and may be qualified. Id at 153-54. The Roe Court
held that after the first trimester, a state may regulate the abortion procedure in a manner that
is reasonably related to the mother's health. Furthermore, after viability, a state is permitted
to regulate or prohibit abortion, in the interest of the potential life of the fetus. Id. at 164-65.
See supra notes 60, 62 and accompanying text.
66. See Dred Scott, 19 How. at 426 ("The Government of the United States bad no right to
interfere for any other purpose but that of protecting the rights of the owner, leaving it alto-
gether with the several States to deal with this race, whether emancipated or not, as each State
may think justice, humanity, and the interests and safety of society, require.").
67. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court delineated the problems it foresaw with leaving the
abortion decision to the states:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying
this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable
even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may
force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be immi-
nent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the dis-
tress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem
of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to
care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing
stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
Id at 153.
68. Of course, it is unlikely that this is an accident. In footnote six in Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989), Justice Scalia argued that the "liberty" protected by a
substantive due process reading of the Fourteenth Amendment refers only to activities that
have historically been free from state control and intervention. Robin West has discussed the
ramifications of this position, pointing out that "Scalia's position, if accepted, would under-
mine ... virtually every major substantive due process case of the last twenty years." See
Robin West, The Ideal of Liberty: A Comment on Michael H. v. Gerald D., 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1373,
1375 (1991) (citing the following decisions as among those that would be damaged by justice
Scalia's analysis: Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding the
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possible result under either the majority's or the dissenters' inter-
pretation of the Constitution in Dred Scott. The majority would not
emancipate the slaves, because it read African-Americans com-
pletely out of the constitutional experiment, defining the document
as a compact among white men and their progeny.6 9
On the other hand, the dissenters, Justices McLean and Curtis,
argued that African-Americans could conceivably become citizens 70
and that Congress was within its powers in banning slavery in the
territories.71 Under the facts of the case, Justices McLean and
Curtis would have held that Dred Scott had the right to sue for his
freedom.72 The dissenters did not argue, however, that Dred Scott
should automatically be set free, along with all slaves, because slav-
ery itself was unconstitutional.7 3 Thus, emancipation could not
have been the social consequence of Dred Scott even had the dissent-
ers prevailed. This is the profound reality that Justice Scalia
ignores.
Justice Scalia's commentary in Casey reflects a kind of conservative
glibness about Dred Scott. He repeatedly suggests that the Court in
Dred Scott would have avoided all kinds of negative consequences for
the nation if it had simply taken a different course and left the mat-
ter of slavery to the individual states.74 Justice Scalia's objection is
not that the Dred Scott court upheld slavery, but rather, that it went
too far in doing so, imposing a "rigid national rule instead of al-
lowing for regional differences." 7 5 In Casey, after his melancholy
panegyric to ChiefJustice Taney, the "lustre" of whose "great Chief
right to die); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (affirming the right to an abortion); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding the right of a married couple to use contra-
ception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (affirming the right of unmarried persons to
use contraception)); supra note 19.
69. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 406 (1857) ("[Elvery person, and every
class and description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
recognized as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but
none other, it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else.").
70. See Dred Scott, 19 How. at 531-33, 572-88 (McLean, J., and Curtis, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that some states considered free African-Americans born in-state, and their descend-
ants, to be citizens of those states, thus making them citizens of the United States). See supra
notes 53, 54, and accompanying text.
71. See Dred Scott, 19 How. at 546-47, 617-18, 633 (McLean,J., and Curtis,J., dissenting)
(reporting numerous laws demonstrating Congress's ability to both allow and prohibit the
practice of slavery in the various territories). Seesupra note 52, 54, 55, and accompanying text.
72. See Dred Scott, 19 How. at 588 (McLean, J., and Curtis, J., dissenting) (arguing that
there were no facts in the case showing Dred Scott not to be a citizen and, as such, he was
entitled to sue in federal court).
73. Dred Scott, 19 How. at 529-633 (McLean,.J., and Curtis, J., dissenting).
74. Scalia maintains that the Dred Scott Court, and especially ChiefJustice Taney, brought
dishonor to themselves and intensified discord in the country by imposing a decision that was
binding on the nation as a whole. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2876, 2883, 2885 (1992) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
75. Id at 2885.
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Justiceship came to be eclipsed by Dred Scott,"76 Justice Scalia states
that:
It is no more realistic for us in this case, than it was for himin that,
to think that an issue of the sort they both involved-an issue in-
volving life and death, freedom and subjugation-can be 'speedily
and finally settled' by the Supreme Court, as President James
Buchanan in his inaugural address said the issue of slavery in the
territories would be. Quite to the contrary, by foreclosing all
democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue arouses, by ban-
ishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants,
even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest
fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead
of allowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs
and intensifies the anguish. 7
7
Justice Scalia's assessment implies that somehow a more prudent
balance could have been struck between the slave states and the free
states. In believing that the Court should have left the matter of
slavery to the states, Justice Scalia's implicit position is that white
political majorities within those states rightfully held the power to
decide the freedom or enslavement of African-Americans. 7
8
Even had the dissenters prevailed, and had the issue been prop-
erly returned to "the political forum" (as if it were not already
there!), the nation would have been saved little "anguish. ' 79 It was
impossible to run away from the central moral issue: either slavery
was going to be constitutionally authorized, and slaves a form of
protected property under specific state laws, or slavery was going to
be unconstitutional and forbidden everywhere. Unless the Supreme
Court in Dred Scott was willing to find enslavement of human beings
a violation of the Declaration of Independence or the Constitu-
tion-which certainly does not appear to be Justice Scalia's posi-
tion-nothing the Court could have done would have prevented the
Civil War. The struggle over the very existence of slavery was the
ultimate and irreducible political cause of the conflict.8 0 As Presi-
76. Id
77. Id. (citation omitted).
78. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885 (arguing that the Dred Scott Court should have followed a
democratic model of "allowing for regional differences..." which implies that if a majority in
a state supported slavery, then the Court had the power to enforce it). See supra text accompa-
nying note 75.
79. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2885 (1992). See infra note
80 and accompanying text.
80. See Stephen L. Carter, ConstitutionalAdjudication and ihe Indeterminate Text: A Prelimina.
Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YAL UJ. 821, 850 ("Dred Scott might have heightened the
nation's divisions over slavery, but the divisions were there in any event, and it is a gross
exaggeration to contend that the decision 'caused' the Civil War."); DON E. FEHRENBACHEa,
THE DRED Sco-rr CASE 562 (1978) ('[S]ince there were many other causes of the hostility
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dent Lincoln had contended, the Union could not long endure "half
slave and half free." 8'
The Court in Dred Scott simply articulated the constitutional un-
derpinnings of the political regime of white supremacy.8 2 This re-
gime was only dismantled by the Civil War and the ensuing passage
of the Thirteenth,83 Fourteenth,8 4 and the Fifteenth Amendments.
85
It took fundamental constitutional changes to dismantle the legal
regime of white supremacy because that regime was rooted in the
very structure of the pre-Civil War Constitution-and not, as Justice
Scalia suggests, in a misguided view of "substantive due process." 8 ,6
To pretend as if the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments
could have been avoided had the Court followed the dissenters in
Dred Scott, is to both conceal the real causes of the Civil War and to
minimize the sweeping radicalism of the Reconstruction Amend-
between North and South, it is difficult to imagine a dissipation of the gathering storm if only
Justice Nelson had been allowed to speak for the Court, as originally planned, in his shorter
and less controversial Dred Scott opinion."). Fehrenbacher also notes that "[m]ost historians
would probably agree that the sectional conflict over slavery was already deep-seated and
pervasive before 1857." Id. at 562.
81. Abraham Lincoln, Address at the Ill. Republican State Convention (June 16, 1858),
in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAMr LINcoLN 461 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
82. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 404-07 (1857). See supra notes 63, 69, and
accompanying text; see infra note 86 and accompanying text.
83. The Thirteenth Amendment, enacted in 1865, abolished involuntary servitude. U.S.
CoNsr. amend. XIII.
84. The Fourteenth Amendment, enacted in 1868, established that all persons born in
the United States "are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
85. The Fifteenth Amendment, enacted in 1870, theoretically extended the right to vote
to African-Americans. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. This right did not translate into immediate
practice, however, because many states instituted prerequisites to voting, such as literacy
tests, ownership of property, and poll taxes, that were specifically designed to prevent the
franchisement of African-Americans. These prerequisites were often effective barriers to vot-
ing for former slaves. J. MORGAN KoUssER, TnE SHAPING or SOUTHERN PoLrrrcs (1974); C.
VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS O THE NEW SoUTH, 1877-1913, at 55-58 (1951); Armond Derfner,
Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1973).
86. In Casey, Justice Scalia states that the Dred Scott decision "rested upon the concept of
'substantive due process' that the [Casey] Court praises and employs today." Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2883 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This
explanation of Dred Scott, however, is at best oversimplified and has been deeply questioned
and criticized. See, e.g., HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEX, EQoUALJUsrICE UNDER LAW
186-87 (1982) ("At most, this notion ofsubstantive due process was one idea among many in
[justice] Taney's 55 pages."); FEHRENBACHER, supra note 80, at 378-84 ("Taney's contribution
to the development of substantive due process was ... meager and somewhat obscure....
Certainly the few lines that he devoted to the subject barely scratched its surface.").
The Dred Scott opinion was more firmly rooted, rather, in the regime of white supremacy
existing under the Constitution of the time. See Dred Scott, 19 How. at 404-07 (describing the
inferiority of African-Americans to whites); supra notes 63, 69, and accompanying text. In
fact,Justice Taney devoted almost half of his lengthy majority opinion to the question of what
place, if any, the "degraded class" held in the American regime. Dred Scott, 19 How. at 408-
27.
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ments.8 7 These Amendments, and the Fourteenth Amendment in
particular, occasioned revolutionary change in federalism and a
sweeping enhancement of the rights of citizens against their own
states.88
It is in the post-Fourteenth Amendment context of selective in-
corporation8 9 and the expansion of the realm of citizen liberty that
Roe emerged. Roe represents a vision of society that takes the ideas
of gender equality and justice seriously. Roe was destined to last
because overturning it would return the question of women's free-
dom and equality to the states, allowing some states to conscript
women into compulsory motherhood while others preserved wo-
men's freedom.90 Such a regime could not long endure in a nation
87. Even had the dissenters prevailed, the decision would only have granted some
African-Americans the right to citizenship; it would not have held the institution of slavery
unconstitutional. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73. Thus, the Civil War and its ensu-
ing Amendments would still have been necessary to accomplish the extraordinary act of
emancipation. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, StAvERY, LAw AND PoLrrcs 299 (1981) (stating
that the Reconstruction agenda "constituted a blueprint for a social revolution of remarkable
proportions... ." considering the pervasiveness of racial prejudice at the time).
88. Seesupranote6l.
89. Selective incorporation refers to the extension of some of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 52, at
431-47. This doctrine led to the development of criteria for determining which rights would
be applicable to the states. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937)
("[fimmunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific
pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. . ." and therefore can be applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 60 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that "the
'immutable principles ofjustice' as conceived by a civilized society. . ." must be violated if a
federal right is to be extended to the states through the concept of due process and the Four-
teenth Amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (applying the federally
guaranteed right to a trial by jury to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment because
this principle is "fundamental to the American scheme ofjustice .... ").
90. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2811 (1992) (discussing
the importance of allowing an individual to make "certain kinds of important decisions" with-
out unjustified government interference). In CaseyJustice O'Connor cites from Carey v. Pop-
ulation Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977), where the Court includes decisions
regarding procreation, marriage, family relationships, contraception, education, and child
rearing as within the realm of protected decisions. O'Connor goes on to state that if these
protections, including the right to have an abortion, were not in place, "the State might as
readily restrict a woman's right to choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to
further asserted state interests in population control, or eugenics, for example. Yet Roe has
been sensibly relied upon to counter any such suggestions." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2811 (cita-
tions omitted). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (describing the Roe Court's
depiction of the problems women would face if the abortion decision were returned to the
states).
Just before Roe was decided, the most common model for state abortion laws resembled
that of the Model Penal Code. The Code allowed abortion only if continuing the pregnancy
would impose a substantial risk of serious physical or mental harm to the mother;, the preg-
nancy resulted from rape; or the pregnancy resulted from incest or other "felonious inter-
course." Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution: A Comment on Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 68 NoTRE Da . L. REv. 11, 27 (1992); James A. Knight,
Note, A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The Contradictions and the Problems,
1972 U. Its.. L.F. 177, 180-81 n.32. Furthermore, there are currently numerous states that
would immediately reinstate strict abortion prohibitions were Roe overruled. See, e.g., State v.
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with a popular passion for the universal apportionment of liberty.91
V. THE AMBIGUITIES OF TRADITION
What does Justice Scalia's perverse analogy reflect about his con-
stitutional methodology in general? Because Dred Scott is both the
most infamous decision in the history of the Supreme Court, and
the logical outcome of an interpretive approach based on textual-
ism-plus-social-tradition, it is a nightmare which haunts the pristine
(although wholly illusory) clarity ofJustice Scalia's originalism. It is
inevitable thatJustice Scalia will continually return to this dread de-
cision, not to analyze it, but just to hang around and accuse others,
like a criminal returning to the scene of the crime. Justice Scalia
likens Dred Scott to Roe to suggest that Roe's flaws reflect a Dred Scott-
like imposition of subjective and arbitrary judicial value choices.92
Dred Scott, however, is actually a perfect demonstration of a Court
following the framers' text and society's traditions, in a faint-hearted
originalist way, without any reference to the spirit of justice or
freedom.93
It is likely that the spirit ofjustice and freedom was largely absent
from the Constitution at that time, at least as it applied to African-
Americans and women, and the Civil War and the Reconstruction
Amendments were needed to supply that spirit.94 Today, that spirit
is the dynamic force within our Constitution; yet, Justice Scalia
Berquist, Nos. 2-91-0970-0989 (D. Ill. filed Jan. 28, 1993) ("[I]f [the abortion rights] deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court are ever reversed or modified or the United States
Constitution is amended to allow protection of the unborn then the former policy of this state
to prohibit abortions unless necessary for the preservation of the mother's life shall be rein-
stated."); State v. Aguillard, 567 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 1990) (stating a similar intention of the
State of Louisiana to prohibit abortions if it becomes possible again).
91. Supreme Court decisions have reflected a preferred image of the Constitution as a
system for "ordered liberty." See, eg., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to all the states); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325-26 (1937) (extending to the states the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of double
jeopardy).
92. In Casey, Justice Scalia criticizes the majority's claim that it is relying on "reasoned
judgment," arguing instead that the decision is only a result of "personal predilection."
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2875-76. Scalia analogizes the erroneousness of this analysis to the faulty
approach taken by the Dred Scott Court, quoting from Justice Curtis's dissenting opinion:
"'When... the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control [the Constitution's]
meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men
[sic], who for the time being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their
own views of what it ought to mean."' Id at 1876 (citation omitted).
93. See supra note 14 and text accompanying notes 39-51.
94. Anticipation of an imminent spirit of freedom is evident in many statements made by
Senators in debates held before the Amendments were enacted. See, e.g., CONO. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1324 (1864) (quoting Republican Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts:
"When th[e Thirteenth A]mendment of the Constitution shall be consummated .... Then the
sacred rights of human nature ... will be protected by the guardian spirit of that law which
make sacred alike the proud homes and lowly cabins of freedom.").
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wants to ignore and traduce it. His principal method of doing so
has become the elevation and constitutionalization of pernicious so-
cial traditions which often predate, and always betray, the spirit of
justice and liberty.95 The appeal to tradition as the definitive locator
of constitutional rights, however, is hopelessly indeterminate, theo-
retically incoherent, and, in justice Scalia's hands, ultimately de-
structive for the progress ofjustice.
The facile rhetoric enshrining "tradition" masks unsolvable
problems of theoretical and historical indeterminacy.96 In the first
place, it is hard to see why the social tradition of legal precedent is
less important than other social traditions, such as statutes. For ex-
ample, why does the post-Roe social tradition of universal protection
of abortion rights matter less than the pre-Roe tradition of selective
regulation and tolerance? Which traditions should the Court en-
force? If a majority of the states permitted abortion, but a minority
banned abortion, would this be reflective of a social tradition em-
bracing or refuting the abortion right as a liberty interest? If a ma-
jority of the states banned abortion at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was written, but allowed it just before Roe, which tradi-
tion would govern? And'-why should we find the social tradition
governing at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to be
controlling if the local political majorities that passed anti-abortion
statutes were made up exclusively of white men? What if the pur-
pose of the Fourteenth Amendment was precisely to change existing
social conditions and to continually judge them by external princi-
ples of freedom? And, if there is a social tradition of women ob-
taining abortions in the face of state-imposed restrictions, should
the spirit of liberty honor the practice of government regulation or
the practice of popular civil disobedience? justice Scalia's "objec-
tive" method begs the question because the essence of adjudicating
liberty is selecting between competing historical traditions.97
95. See, ag., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2679 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the Court was erroneous in invalidating a religious prayer in a public school gradua-
tion, because of the "longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public
celebrations."); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. I10 (1989) (denying visitation rights to a
natural father of a child whose mother was married to another man at the time of the child's
birth, based on the fact that there had been no societal tradition recognizing paternity rights
in this context). See also id. at 127 n.6 (agreeing with the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), denying any right to engage in consensual homosexual conduct because of
the age-old tradition of state criminal sodomy laws).
96. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 19, at 1089 ('[H]istory provides ambiguous guidance
both because historical traditions can be indeterminate, and because even when we discover a
dear historical tradition it is hardly obvious what the existence of that tradition tells us about
the Constitution's meaning.").
97. See id at 1087 ('The decision to look to tradition for guidance in defining fundamen-
tal rights . . . carries great risk.") The authors further noted that "j]udges must choose be-
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As a theoretical matter, it is hard to see why we should rely exclu-
sively on social consensus from the past ("tradition") to define con-
stitutional rights today. One would think that if majoritarian
notions were to inform our present reading of the Constitution, the
relevant notions would come from contemporary majorities. 98 Ameri-
can democracy was born out of an attack on hereditary government,
both in the sense of royalty, and rule by past generations of future
ones.99 Why should political majorities in states that once banned
abortion be more important than the fact that a majority of men and
women today believe in abortion rights, 100 or indeed that the
Supreme Court has upheld the right to abortion since 1973?101
It is curious thatJustice Scalia denounces the "political pressure"
applied on the Court by both sides of the abortion debate.'0 2 "How
upsetting it is," he writes, "that so many of our citizens ... think
that we Justices should properly take into account their views, as
though we were engaged not in ascertaining an objective law, but in
determining some kind of social consensus."10 3 Yet,Justice Scalia's
tween competing traditions those which will receive legal protection-and the choice of, say,
heterosexuality over homosexuality (or homophobia over tolerance) requires value judg-
ments." Id
98. See Charles Mcc. Mathias, Jr., Ordered Liberty: The Original Intent of the Constitution, 47
MD. L REV. 174 (1987) (discussing why constitutional analysis should take into account con-
temporary interpretations). Mathias argues that
arbitrarily fixing the meaning [of the Constitution] at the intent of the founders robs
modem America of the power to consent .... A civil war, twenty-six amendments,
and tremendous social, political, and technological changes have put flesh on the
bones of the Constitution, thus altering our reading and relationship to it. Why
should we ignore this history when we read the Constitution? Why should we who
have been molded by that history not participate in the debate?
Id at 176-77. But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructionist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1251 (1987) (arguing that while sticking too rigidly to
original intent interpretations would ossify the Constitution and "deprive it of... contempo-
rary moral vitality ... morality itself is deeply controversial, and to release Constitutional
interpretation from all obligation to historic understanding would invite the disintegration of
much of what is best in our political tradition."); Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation:
Comment: A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 684
n.5 (1985) ("[Ihe risk of majoritarian overreaching with respect to things that originalists
value is quite substantial given the range of activities toward which legislatures might direct
their attention.").
99. The rejection of hereditary government is particularly evident in many of Thomas
Paine's essays. See, eg., 1 THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in WRrrINrs OF THoMAs PAINE 67, 99,
118 (Moncore D. Conway ed., 1967) (making such pronouncements as "so far as we approve
of monarchy... in America the law is king... so in free countries ... there ought to be no
other..... and "[wi]e have it in our power to begin the world over again.").
100. See Thomas J. Billitteri et al., Abortion Ruling Expected Today-Activists, Candidates Brace
for Key Decision, ATLANrA J. & CorsT., June 29, 1992, at Al (reporting a National Abortion
Rights Action League (NARAL) survey finding that 68% of Americans generally support a
woman's right to an abortion). The same percentages were attained in a survey conducted by
John Willke, former president of the anti-abortion National Right to Life Committee. Id.
101. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
102. Planned Parenthood of.S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2884 (1992).
103. Id.
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own method of ascertaining "objective" law refers explicitly to a
kind of "social consensus": the consensus of (some) people who
lived in the past. 0 4 If Justice Scalia would not take a poll in the
present to determine whether abortion rights should be considered
a constitutionally protected liberty interest, why does he take a poll
from the past? If he would not put constitutional rights to the peo-
ple for an election today, why would he, in effect, conduct a referen-
dum among the dead? His method has the paradoxical quality of
being both indefensibly antidemocratic and indefensibly
majoritarian: the rights of the living are defined not by themselves
in a more democratic present, but by political majorities who inhab-
ited an undemocratic past.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is likely that Justice Scalia will continue to have recourse to se-
lective social traditions that permit the subjugation of personal free-
dom to state power, especially where the freedom transgressed is
that of women and racial minorities. But freedom in a democratic
society has its own history and its own social momentum. Dred Scott
was overturned by abolitionism, the Civil War, and the Fourteenth
Amendment.10 5 The decision stands not for flawed legal reason-
ing-for its reasoning may not have been flawed at all given the con-
stitutional assumptions it inherited-but, rather, for an oppressive
social system that denied the possibility of freedom to millions of
people. Roe, on the other hand, was saved by the women's move-
ment and a mass upsurge of citizen activism.106 It was also saved by
certain conservative Justices who, unlike Justice Scalia, understood
that overturning it would leave women's freedom and equality to
104. See notes 95, 96, 97, and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
106. According to Women's history Professor Ruth Whitney, "out in the street you speak
with numbers. You say: For every one of us here, there are a hundred back home." Diane
Mason, NOW Hopes Washington Protest March Till Inspire Activism, ST. PETERSBURG TMES, April
3, 1992, at A2 (discussing the potential impact of the April 5, 1992 March for Womens Lives).
Citizen activism has been credited for many of the accomplishments of the suffrage move-
ment, the Civil Rights movement, and the anti-Vietnam War movement. Id. See, e.g., Daniel
Egler, Pro-Choice Forces Gearing Up for Battle Over Roe v. Wade, Cim. TRim., March 13, 1989, at C2
(reporting the mobilization of pro-choice activists to pressure the Supreme Court to uphold
Roe and a woman's right to abortion); Group Predicts Roe v. Wade Will Stand, UPI, July 5, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (quoting Mr. Gerald Celent, director of the Socio-
Economic Research Institute of America, stating that an outpouring of reaction from the pub-
lic (following Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)] will keep the
Supreme Court from ultimately overturning Roe); Nicholas Platt, US. Feminist Movement Gains
Momentum With Abortion Ruling, Reuters, July 7, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Reuters File (discussing the upsurge in membership in, and volunteers at, the National Or-
ganization for Women following the Supreme Court's decision in Webster by women who
feared that it was a signal that the Court would overrule Roe).
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the mercy of the states, violating the universalizing spirit of the
Fourteenth Amendment, while sending the country into turmoil,
and destroying the Court's legitimacy.10 7 These Justices under-
stood that it is very difficult to make people go back in time, to un-
learn freedom, to surrender rights they once had.10 8 As history has
taught us, the country could not long survive half-free, half-slave. 10 9
Far from reenacting the consequences of Dred Scott, as Justice Scalia
claims, the Court in Casey saved the country from the same kind of
civil division and misery that the Dred Scott Court helped to bring
about.110
If the precondition for social progress is social memory, the reac-
tionary political project requires the obliteration of memory: the
conflation of contrary events in history, the blurring of political
meanings, and the poisoning of a coherent vision of freedom's his-
torical progress. Justice Scalia's casually proffered equation of Dred
Scott and Roe is thus characteristic, not atypical, of the conservative
project. Yet we can be grateful for the overall trajectory of demo-
cratic freedom: Dred Scott and slavery are gone with the wind, while
Roe survives. Roe may be somewhat battered by events, but still it
remains, its core essence protected, its spirit alive. It stands as an
integral part of the new constitutional regime of liberty and equality
inaugurated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
107. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809-12 (1992) (dis-
cussing the negative repercussions that would result if Roe were not upheld); supra notes 67,
90, and accompanying text. The Supreme Court asserted that in order to maintain legitimacy
and constancy, it must impart its decisions "as grounded truly in principle.. ." and must
stand by these principled decisions until "the understanding of the issue has.., changed so
fundamentally as to render the commitment obsolete." Id at 2814-16.
108. As Thomas Paine argued in The Rights of Man, "there does not exist in the compass of
language an arrangement of words to express so much as the means of effecting a counter-
revolution. The means must be an obliteration of knowledge; and it has never yet been dis-
covered how to make a man unknow his knowledge or unthink his thoughts." 2 THOMAS PAINE,
The Rights of Man, in WRrriNGS OF THOMAS PAINE 258, 360 (Moncore D. Conway ed., 1967).
109. See .supra note 81 and accompanying text.
110. If Casey had overruled Roe, thus allowing states to prohibit or severely restrict abor-
tions, the divisions and conflicts already existing nationally under the state regulations per-
missible today would be greatly exacerbated. See, eg., Alissa Rubin, The Abortion Wars Aren'I
Over; Beyond the Court, Battles Over Access and Restrictions HaveJust Begun, WAsH. PosT, Dec. 13,
1992, at C2 (discussing how abortion restrictions, and the scarcity of doctors who will perform
them, are especially difficult for women who are poor or who live in rural areas, and force
women to cross state lines to find access to abortions); Arguments Before the Court, 61 U.S.L.W.
3295 (1992) (discussing the issue of the constitutionality of Abortion Rescue's blockade tactics
preventing women from accessing abortions). See supra note 7 (finding that certain abortion
restrictions are, in fact, permitted).
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